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1.  Executive Summary 
 
 
 
At the World Summit in 2005, Heads of State and government unanimously 
endorsed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).1  Member States agreed that each 
state is responsible for protecting its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.  The international community acknowledged 
a collective responsibility to assist states in providing this protection.  Furthermore, 
in circumstances in which states are “manifestly failing” to protect their own 
populations, the international community recognised its responsibility to take 
“timely and decisive” action to do so.   
 
Prominent within the agreed text on R2P is a focus upon prevention.  “This 
responsibility,” stated the resolution, “entails the prevention of such crimes, 
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.”  The 
international community should “support the United Nations in establishing an early 
warning capability,” and signatories “intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and 
appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity and to assisting 
those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.”  Operationalising 
these statements, however, presents a formidable challenge.   
 
The present report examines this responsibility, and considers what may constitute 
“appropriate and necessary means” to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.  Section One explores the conceptual 
challenges and opportunities presented by the ‘responsibility to prevent’.  Section 
Two offers a number of strategic frameworks through which specific operational 
measures can be developed in a manner likely to maximise their effectiveness.  
Section Three presents individual strategies that can be utilised towards the 
structural and direct prevention of mass atrocity crimes.  Implementing the 
‘responsibility to prevent’, through utilising international support and cooperation, 
and through the identification and implementation of a range of strategies, can have 
the profound impact intended by those at the World Summit.   
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2.  Introduction
 
 
At the World Summit in 2005, Heads of State and government attending the sixtieth 
session of the United Nations General Assembly unanimously endorsed the following 
statement:  
 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  
This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.  We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it.  The international community 
should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning 
capability.  
 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to 
help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity.  In this context, we are prepared to take collective 
action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in 
accordance with the charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis 
and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, 
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly 
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.  We stress the need for the General 
Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter 
and international law.  We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and 
appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and 
to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break 
out.  
 
140. We fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-
General on the Prevention of Genocide.2 
 
Since then, there has been discernable progress toward translating the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) into specific policies and strategies.  In January 2009 
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the report of the UN Secretary-General Implementing the Responsibility to Protect 
focussed international attention on the kinds of actions that may be required.3  The 
debate on R2P in the General Assembly in July 2009 reiterated international support 
for the principle, and further engaged actors with its implementation.   
 
The Responsibility to Protect report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which first developed the concept, identified that 
“Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect.”4  
This is reflected in the World Summit Outcome Document statement (above), in 
which prevention figures prominently.  “This responsibility,” stated the resolution, 
“entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through 
appropriate and necessary means.”  The international community should “support 
the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability,” and signatories 
“intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build 
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before 
crises and conflicts break out.”5   
 
The present report contributes to this discussion by considering what might be the 
“appropriate and necessary” means to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.  It refrains from advocating any particular 
strategy in an applied setting; determination of an appropriate response is always 
context-specific and requires case-specific analysis.  The purpose of this report is not 
to advocate particular strategies, but rather to examine current research in this field.  
Section One explores the conceptual challenges and opportunities surrounding the 
prevention of R2P crimes.  Section Two offers a number of strategic frameworks 
through which specific operational measures can be developed to maximise their 
effectiveness.  Section Three presents individual strategies that can be utilised 
towards structural and direct prevention of mass atrocity crimes.  Operationalising 
the ‘responsibility to prevent’, through utilising international support and 
cooperation, and through the identification and implementation of a range of 
strategies, can have the profound impact intended by those at the World Summit.   
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3.  The ‘Responsibility to Prevent’:    Conceptual Issues      and 
Opportunities
 
 
A Three Pillar Approach to the Prevention of Mass Atrocities 
 
In the UN Secretary-General’s report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Ban 
Ki-moon outlined a three pillar strategy for advancing the agenda of the 
Responsibility to Protect:  
 
 Pillar One 
 
 The protection responsibilities of the State  
 
  Pillar Two 
 
 International assistance and capacity-building 
 
 Pillar Three 
 
 Timely and decisive response6 
 
The strategy is a valuable conceptual tool for elucidating the three core components 
of R2P, and those responsible for them.  It highlights that preventing genocide and 
mass atrocities is an international, as well as a national responsibility.  Moreover, it 
focuses attention on the need for early action, and long-term measures such as 
capacity-building, alongside appropriate action when a crisis is imminent. 
At the operational level specific strategies to prevent mass atrocity crimes may range 
between and across the pillars.  Media-based (or related) strategies, for example, 
can be situated within each pillar and across them all.  A state may enshrine the 
independence of the media in its constitution as a pillar one measure, or may receive 
international assistance in doing so under pillar two.  Under pillar three, the 
international community may remind a nation’s leaders of the consequences of 
disseminating incitement through the media, as happened in Cote d’Ivoire in 2004.7  
Similarly, a state may pursue security sector reform as part of its pillar one 
obligations, may receive international assistance in doing so under the rubric of pillar 
two, or may agree to do so under an international agreement forged as part of a 
pillar three response to an imminent crisis.  In Section Three, this report will further 
explore how the three pillar approach can guide the effective utilisation of 
preventive strategies.    
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Utilising Windows of Opportunity 
 
Strategies to ameliorate risk of genocide or mass atrocities must not only be 
carefully selected on a case-by-case basis, but ideally utilised at the earliest 
opportunity, when they are likely to have the greatest impact.  The World Summit 
Outcome document identified a “timely and decisive response” as of key importance 
when “national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations” from 
R2P crimes.8  Timely action is not just a key component of pillar three measures, 
however, but also underpins pillars one and two.  Some of the potentially most 
effective prevention strategies involve “assisting those which are under stress before 
crises and conflicts break out.”  Indeed, as the Genocide Prevention Task Force 
reported, “the greatest opportunities for prevention appear long before violence 
begins.”9  Early intervention, according to the Task Force, is the preferred course of 
action, not only in “strategic, resource, and moral terms”, but because “engaging 
early can successfully obviate the need for a much more difficult crisis response at a 
later stage.”10   
 
Stages of Prevention 
 
Structural Prevention strategies 
 
Structural, or pre-crisis intervention strategies, include measures that promote good 
governance and strengthen the rule of law.  They may focus on strengthening civil 
society institutions, fighting corruption, or offering support to those working to 
improve systems from within.  Structural prevention measures are generally 
conceived of as falling under pillars one and two of R2P.  They are appropriate in 
nations that can be identified as at some, but not imminent, risk of mass atrocities 
(for further information on identifying nations at risk of mass atrocities, see Asia-
Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Preventing Genocide and Mass 
Atrocities: Causes and Paths of Escalation).  That is, they are appropriate strategies in 
circumstances where some preconditions for genocide and mass atrocities are 
present, but there may also be the will to implement ameliorative strategies.  
Section Three of this report expands on a range of these measures, and how they 
can be utilised in a timely and effective manner.   
 
Direct Prevention strategies 
 
Direct prevention measures, by contrast, are utilised in circumstances where there is 
not only potential for conflict, but where it appears that potential is increasing.  They 
are often employed after limited outbreaks of violence, in circumstances where 
there is clear potential for extreme violence.  They may include preventive 
diplomacy, economic sanctions (or the threat thereof), specific forms of aid 
conditionality, or the promise of economic inducements for desired outcomes.  
Some direct prevention measures may occur under pillar one.  These may include, 
for example, the bringing to justice of perpetrators of ethnically motivated violence, 
or disseminating messages through the media that advocate a return to greater 
peace and cooperation.  Under pillar two, the international community can play a 
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vital role in supporting nations at this stage.  International actors can work 
cooperatively with nations to support the implementation of indigenous solutions, to 
try to resolve refugee or internally displaced persons (IDP) issues, for example.  
Section Three of this report explores direct prevention strategies and how they can 
be used to halt and reverse escalating conflicts. 
 
Late-stage Direct Prevention strategies 
 
When there is a high likelihood of imminent mass atrocities, more assertive 
strategies may be required to avert the conflict escalation process.  Under pillar 
three of the responsibility to protect, these may include coercive measures.  Section 
Three of this report considers measures that may be necessary for late-stage 
direction prevention of genocide and mass atrocities.   
 
The opportunities and challenges of an early engagement approach 
 
Structural, pre-crisis prevention measures not only present the greatest 
opportunities to prevent genocide and mass atrocities, but to do so in the most cost-
effective way.  Nevertheless, there remain substantial barriers to the widespread 
utilisation of such measures.  Primary among them is a lack of dedicated resources.  
Without the urgency of an imminent crisis to provoke action or attract resources, 
there remains a dearth of capacity dedicated to early prevention measures.  This 
issue is further exacerbated by the difficulty of proving the success of such measures.  
A nation that remains peaceful lacks the dramatic newsworthiness of conflict; 
furthermore, critics may contend that the country would have remained peaceful 
even in the absence of the measures implemented.   
 
Part of this challenge lies in the nature of the tools currently available for providing 
early warning of mass atrocity crimes.  Genocide and mass atrocities are extreme 
and relatively uncommon events and the causes of these types of extreme violence 
are complex and multifaceted.  Scholars have identified a wide range of risk factors 
that can indicate some likelihood of future mass atrocities, but current models of risk 
of genocide and mass atrocity can offer only broad guidance.  This has both 
strengths and limitations.  By offering a macro-analysis, watch-lists identify the need 
for more detailed investigation of risk in particular nations.  For example, a watch-list 
such as that in the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect’s report 
Preventing Genocide and Mass Atrocities: Causes and Paths of Escalation, typically 
identifies 8-10 nations as at the highest risk of extreme violence, with a further 15-20 
also considered at lower, but still substantial risk.  The ability to identify nations at 
increased risk of mass atrocities is a valuable one.  At the same time, however, it 
presents some very real challenges for genocide prevention.  First, the relatively 
large number of nations identified at risk (compounded by overlapping but differing 
lists produced by organisations using different measures) makes it difficult to focus 
the limited resources available to have the greatest chance of preventing future 
calamity.  Warning lists can be used very effectively to provoke in-depth analysis of 
‘at-risk’ nations, but this is dependent on sufficient resources to both conduct and 
respond to such analyses.  Second, such long lists of ‘at-risk’ nations may contribute 
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to complacency, as warnings become diluted by their sheer number, and as violence 
escalates in only a few cases.  The following two recommendations may contribute 
to alleviating these issues. 
 
Improving the ability to provide early warning of mass atrocity crimes  
 
There is a clear need to fund further research into the paths of escalation that 
culminate in mass atrocities.  In particular, while there is a reasonable understanding 
of risk factors for genocide, our understanding of factors that inhibit the onset of 
mass violence is far more limited.  Research focussed on stabilising factors, or de-
accelerators, may enable a more nuanced approach to identifying nations at risk of 
mass atrocity.  Programs such as Swisspeace’s Early Warning Program FAST 
international have sought to develop this capacity further.  Further research also 
needs to be conducted on the issue of why genocide occurs when it does.  A greater 
understanding of the development of the risk escalation process over time, and 
triggers for its onset, would facilitate more “timely” and appropriate risk-
amelioration strategies.    
 
A Quantitative Approach to Mass Atrocity Prevention 
 
A new approach to quantifying the success (or otherwise) of efforts to prevent mass 
atrocities could promote increased capacity for structural prevention.  At present, 
the success of prevention work can only be defined by ‘non-events’, that is cases 
that did not escalate or mass atrocities that did not occur.  Even in circumstances 
where it appeared there was a very high risk of imminent genocide, this 
identification may be interpreted as less than rigorous.  For earlier stage direct 
prevention or structural prevention efforts, such claims can be viewed as tenuous at 
best.  Moreover, claiming certain ‘successes’ belies the often long-term presence of 
low level risk factors, that may still have the potential to escalate at a future point.   
Adopting a public health model approach to quantifying the outcomes of efforts to 
prevent mass atrocity crimes may offer a way in which to avoid these pitfalls.  In 
recent years, a number of datasets have been developed that quantify incidents of 
mass atrocities, and death tolls from war and mass atrocity crimes in the twentieth 
century.  These have enabled aggregate figures to be tabulated.  A public health 
model approach might monitor these figures over time – in a similar way to the 
tracking of other causes of death or incidences of disease – to consider the evolution 
of mass atrocity crimes over time.  Compared with historical data, a downward 
global trend, for example, might indicate successful mitigation strategies (although 
controls would need to be in place for confounding variables).  This kind of data may 
provide insights as to the effectiveness of structural prevention efforts without the 
conundrum of measuring ‘non-events’.   
 
The Precautionary Principle  
 
Adopting a public health model approach may also contribute to moving from the 
current culture of inaction and reaction to mass atrocities, to a culture of prevention.  
A strong argument has been developed, for example, for applying the precautionary 
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principle to genocide prevention.  According to the precautionary principle, typically 
invoked in environmental epidemiology, if “there is uncertainty as to the likelihood 
of a catastrophic event, the costs and consequences of doing nothing are greater 
than those of prevention.” 11  The principle has justified intervention processes to 
prevent mass outbreaks of diseases such as avian influenza and SARS.  Organisations 
such as the World Health Organisation have ongoing funding, resources and capacity 
to respond to such threats well prior to their potentially most lethal phase.  Applying 
the precautionary principle to the field of genocide prevention “shifts the locus of 
intervention in genocide from proof of intent after the event to predict and prevent 
before the event … Genocide’s catastrophic consequences compel public health 
providers to put preventive principles into practice.”12  By providing a framework of 
risk reduction in which to locate structural prevention programs, this could facilitate 
the institutionalisation of funding and capacity for them.  
 
A ladder, a toolbox, or something else?   
 
Two general frameworks have guided practitioners seeking to operationalise 
preventive strategies in the wider field of conflict prevention – the ‘ladder’ and the 
‘toolbox’.13  The ‘ladder’ approach typically outlines a graduated sequence of 
measures, with stronger measures being utilised in situations of increasing severity.  
The toolbox approach suggests the availability of a range of measures, from which 
the most appropriate may be selected at will.  Operational typologies specific to the 
prevention of genocide and mass atrocities have similarly adopted these 
approaches.  For example, the ICISS report, The Responsibility to Protect, posits “a 
continuum of graduated policy instruments”.14  Co-chair of the Commission Gareth 
Evans adopted a ‘toolbox’ approach in his own book on R2P.15   
 
In practice, however, it has been acknowledged that both approaches encompass 
many of the same policy options, and opportunities for escalation can be more 
limited than might have been expected.16  For example, sanctions, arms embargoes 
and diplomatic endeavours are often features of each approach.  Historically, nations 
subject to some of these punitive measures have often continued to pursue the 
same policies, and the imposition of further measures – such as additional sanctions 
– has not had a lasting impact.  This was evidenced in the sanctions imposed upon 
Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s rule, for example.  Moreover, the ‘toolbox’ style 
approach implies a discrete ‘problem’, for which there is a correct tool, and that its 
application will ‘repair’ the problem.  This belies the complex and ongoing nature of 
many of the conflicts that lead to mass atrocities, and the ongoing efforts that are 
typically required to reduce the risk of mass atrocities occurring.    
 
A Framework of Engagement 
 
The present report proposes neither a ‘toolbox’ or ‘ladder’ framework, but rather a 
framework of engagement.  With ongoing, active engagement of the international 
community, a multifaceted approach tailored on a case-by-case basis may provide 
the greatest possibilities for risk mitigation.  As the Genocide Prevention Task Force 
reported, “When high-level officials are actively engaged, progress is usually 
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possible.”17  Key participants  may be the United Nations, regional organisations, 
neighbouring nations or NGOs.  There is substantial evidence of the effectiveness of 
ongoing engagement in mitigating the risk of mass atrocities.  For example, the 
notable successes of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) ‘Missions of Long Duration’ suggest the effectiveness of ongoing engagement 
as a framework that curbs conflict-escalation and facilitates risk-mitigation.  
Additionally, several examples of ‘negative’ case studies of genocide and mass 
atrocities – that is instances in which there appeared to be a very high likelihood of 
massive violence, but it did not eventuate – are notable for their high level of 
ongoing international engagement.  The conflicts in Northern Ireland and Apartheid 
South Africa have been considered in this way, for example.18  While other 
explanations cannot be dismissed in either case, the high degree of international 
focus and involvement in them appears a likely contributor to the ongoing restraint 
exhibited by parties to each conflict.   
 
An Incremental Approach 
 
Engagement also implies an incremental and ongoing, rather than absolute and 
finite, approach to the prevention of R2P crimes.  Too often, preventing genocide 
and mass atrocities has been framed around the stark choices of doing nothing or 
‘sending in the Marines’ during acute crises.19  This false dichotomy has served as an 
excuse for inaction.  Yet even in the midst of the Holocaust, those who did the 
limited amount they could were often able to have a real impact.  The Swedish 
diplomat Raoul Wallenberg, for example, saved as many as 100,000 lives through 
utilising every means available. 20  Moreover, his actions convinced diplomats in 
other legations that it was possible to similarly make a difference: 
 
Soon the other neutral legations in Budapest began copying Wallenberg’s 
idea, issuing their own protective passes ... Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, the 
Holy See’s Papal Nuncio, even the honorary consul of El Salvador issued 
protective passes ... even the International Red Cross issued protective 
passes, although its passes had no governmental backing at all.21 
 
An incremental approach, utilising whatever will and capacity is available, may 
substantially contribute to averting mass atrocities, and saving lives during their 
acute phases.  Furthermore, an incremental approach facilitates at least some 
intercession, even in the absence of appropriate action by the UN Security Council.  
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4.  Strategic Frameworks for Operationalisating the 
‘Responsibility to Prevent
 
 
A Flexible Approach 
 
The multiple and complex roots of genocide and mass atrocities, and the manner in 
which they combine over time to lead to extreme violence, add to the challenge of 
effective prevention.  The Genocide Prevention Task Force report acknowledged, 
“History has shown that genocide and mass atrocities can manifest themselves in 
highly variable ways, and we should not assume that future perpetrators will follow 
old patterns.”22  The UN Secretary-General specifically addressed this issue in his 
report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: 
 
In dealing with the diverse circumstances in which crimes and violations 
relating to the responsibility to protect are planned, incited and/or 
committed, there is no room for a rigidly sequenced strategy or for tightly 
defined “triggers” for action.23 
 
While individual strategies likely to mitigate risk of mass atrocities can be identified 
and implemented to great effect (and are discussed in Section Three of this report), 
the complexity of extreme violence may limit their applicability and effectiveness in 
particular cases.  Responding to risk of genocide and mass atrocities requires a 
nuanced and flexible approach.     
 
Strategic Frameworks 
 
Before delving into a discussion of the role and value of individual strategies, it is 
therefore worth considering how broader, strategic frameworks can guide 
practitioners seeking to operationalise the responsibility to prevent.  In this section, 
three broad and complementary frameworks are explored as approaches to mass 
atrocity prevention.  These include utilising the advice of area specialists, mobilising 
the international community in support of R2P and utilising a cooperative approach 
to effect change.  While not individual strategies themselves, actions within these 
approaches have the clear potential to be of substantial impact in mitigating the risk 
of genocide and mass atrocities.   
 
Utilising the knowledge of Area Specialists and Expert Advice 
 
Extreme violence can manifest in different ways.  While general inferences can be 
made as to causes, paths of escalation and potential risk-mitigation strategies, each 
event is also the culmination of a unique set of circumstances.  Just as general 
causative models can offer some insights, but not fully explain the particular path of 
an individual case, so too are general risk-mitigation strategies constrained by the 
specificity of a given situation.  Area specialists – whether they be diplomats, 
scholars or nongovernmental organisation (NGO) workers – offer a level of expertise 
essential to effective preventative work.  As the Genocide Prevention Task Force 
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report noted, “There are few, if any, one-size-fits-all solutions.  Effective strategies 
must be tailored carefully, based on a deep understanding of case-specific 
characteristics.”24  Yet too often expert advice and warnings have gone unheeded.   
If we consider the events leading to the Rwandan genocide as an example, a litany of 
missed opportunities can be identified in which the advice of area specialists and 
those commissioned to give expert advice – had it been heeded – could have made a 
very real difference.  Some of this advice was given decades in advance.  After 
investigating the ethnic violence in Rwanda in December 1963 and January 1964, for 
example, UN Commissioner Max Dorsinville recommended that “all means of solving 
the refugee problem should be urgently explored.”25  At the same time, East African 
researcher Aaron Segal published a succinct, yet prescient treatise on ‘Alternatives 
to Annihilation’, in which he neatly outlined measures necessary to prevent 
“genocide” there, including resolving the refugee problem.26  At this stage, there 
were clear opportunities for risk-mitigation strategies, yet they were largely ignored.   
By the early 1990s, area specialists, NGOs and commissioned investigations issued 
multiple warnings of the impending catastrophe in Rwanda.27  Yet in this case, the 
ongoing warnings were somewhat discredited because of their sheer number – a 
bizarre calculation in hindsight.28  Even the August 1993 report of UN Special 
Rapporteur Mr. B. Ndiaye, warning that ‘genocide’ may be an applicable term for 
some of the violence there, failed to elicit an appropriate response.  Effective 
operationalisation of the Responsibility to Protect, however, requires an approach 
geared to heeding such warnings. 
 
Mobilising the International Community in support of R2P 
 
Tremendous opportunities for the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities exist 
through the mobilisation of organs of the international community.  The United 
Nations and its entities have the potential and legitimacy to act in ways that can 
substantially reduce the risk of mass atrocities.  Mainstreaming the consideration of 
R2P into all relevant United Nations activities would be a powerful approach toward 
this goal.  In the same way that gender considerations and disaster risk reduction 
considerations are incorporated into development programs where relevant, there is 
the opportunity for R2P to also be explicitly considered in the development of UN 
programs.  Furthermore, institutionalising R2P in this way would convey a strong 
statement as to its importance in the international arena.   
 
Regional organisations can also play a powerful role in operationalising R2P.  
Regional organisations may be able to offer specific resources towards mass atrocity 
prevention, such as mediation, preventive diplomacy or a preventive deployment of 
peacekeeping forces.  They can also play a substantial role in advocating the 
importance of R2P and the implementation of preventive strategies in their region.  
Similarly, NGOs may be able to mainstream R2P considerations into relevant 
programs, further highlighting the centrality of the concept in the international 
community.   
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Working Cooperatively to effect change 
 
A cooperative, rather than coercive, approach to risk-mitigation is more likely to be 
effective, and far more likely to gain the endorsement of UN member states.  
Cooperative strategies typically require engagement at earlier stages of crisis 
prevention, but can subvert more acute crises.  Moreover, there is substantial 
evidence that there are windows of opportunity in which at-risk nations welcome, 
and even request assistance, prior to adopting the radical ideologies that may lead to 
extreme violence.  The historian Robert Melson has contended that utilising such an 
opportunity may have forestalled the Armenian genocide: “Had the Great Powers, 
even without Russia and Austria, helped Turkish democracy to establish itself, it is 
likely that even then the empire would have undergone grave tribulations, but the 
Armenian genocide possibly could have been averted.”29  Similarly, had the 
international community responded to Rwanda’s requests for assistance with its 
refugee problem in the 1960s, the explosive confluence of events in the 1990s may 
have been averted.   
 
Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect in more developed nations 
 
In many cases, the only viable option for preventive work is that undertaken co-
operatively. Practitioners often consider poor, developing nations as the 
paradigmatic ‘at-risk’ nation, and common risk-mitigation strategies are primarily 
appropriate for this type of target nation.  Yet as the Implementing the Responsibility 
to Protect report commented, “the worst human tragedies of the past century were 
not confined to any particular part of the world.  They occurred in the North and in 
the South, in poor, medium-income and relatively affluent countries.”30   
 
An examination of current watch-lists for nations at risk of mass atrocities reveals a 
substantial number of politically, economically and/or militarily powerful nations on 
these lists.  For example, Genocide Watch’s ‘Countries at Risk of Genocide, Politicide 
or Killing’ current list includes nuclear power Pakistan in its highest risk category.31  
The political scientists Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr, who have conducted extensive 
work in preparing such lists, placed China in fifth position on their most recent 
watchlist.  Genocide Watch includes Turkey and India as nations at mid-level risk, 
while the Genocide Prevention Project includes China and Indonesia at this second-
tier risk level.  Harff and Gurr place Saudi Arabia and Egypt at a similar ranking.  
  
The kinds of strategies useful for structural or direct prevention in such nations 
might be very different from those appropriate in smaller, developing nations.  
Moreover, the international position of some of these nations makes a cooperative 
approach the only viable one.  While the variance in the watch-lists themselves is an 
area future research should target – particularly in the identification of mid-level risk 
– the prevalence of strategically and politically significant nations on these lists is 
somewhat concerning.  There is a clear need for risk-mitigation strategies to be 
developed and considered that focus upon working cooperatively with relatively 
powerful nations.  At the same time, however, the political sensitivities of such lists 
constrains both their development and use.    
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5.  Strategies for Operationalising the Responsibility to Prevent
 
 
In addition to the broad approaches toward prevention outlined in Section Two, 
there are a range of specific measures that can be employed in specific contexts to 
stabilise or de-escalate the risk of mass atrocities.  The following strategies for 
operationalising the responsibility to prevent are presented in three broad 
subsections: structural prevention strategies, direct prevention strategies and late-
stage direct prevention strategies.  Structural prevention strategies may be most 
useful in nations where preconditions for genocide are present, such as those 
identified in the Asia-Pacific Centre’s earlier report, Preventing Genocide and Mass 
Atrocities: Causes and Paths of Escalation.  Direct prevention strategies are most 
likely to be effective when a nation is experiencing crisis and upheaval, and it 
appears a risk escalation process is underway.  In times of imminent emergency, 
late-stage direct prevention strategies may be able to stabilise the situation, and 
contribute to de-escalation.  It is important to recognise, however, that individual 
strategies can be utilised in multiple ways and sometimes at multiple stages, and 
these categories are intended for guidance only.   
 
Utilising Strategies Effectively 
 
Any particular strategy will have both advantages and disadvantages that need to be 
weighed carefully before implementation.  A multifaceted approach is likely to be 
most effective, involving a unique combination of strategies tailored to the particular 
circumstance in question.  Moreover, there must be an ongoing awareness of the 
potential to exacerbate the risk.  The political scientist Peter Uvin, for example, has 
documented how development programs in Rwanda prior to 1994 may have 
inadvertently contributed to the risk of genocide there.32  There are other well 
documented incidences of poorly planned interventions having pronounced negative 
effects.33  Nevertheless, we can identify particular types of action, and individual 
strategies, most likely to have a positive impact.  With appropriate and careful use, 
they can lead to real reductions in the risk of extreme violence.  
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6.  Strategies for Structural Prevention
 
 
Strategies for Structural Prevention 
 
Democracy as a Protective Factor, Supporting Nations Transitioning to Democracy 
 
Economic Growth and Economic Stability 
          Development Assistance 
 
Good Governance 
          Strengthening legal protections and judicial systems 
          Security Sector Reform 
          Fighting Corruption 
          Promoting Civil Society and Civil Institutions 
 
Educating for Tolerance 
 
Programs to Combat the Political Manipulation of Ethnic Tensions 
 
Promotion of Human Rights 
 
Develop the Capacity of the United Nations to respond to potential R2P Crimes 
 
Develop the Capacity of Regional Organisations to contribute to prevention 
 
Deterrence as a Form of Prevention 
 
 
Democracy as a Protective Factor, Supporting nations transitioning to democracy 
 
Democratic nations rarely perpetrate genocide and mass atrocities.  Democracy, 
therefore, is a strongly protective factor, and possibly the strongest in the arsenal of 
structural prevention measures.  Extensive research supports this finding, including 
the work and statistical analyses of the political scientist Rudy Rummel, and the 
findings of the Political Instability Task Force.34   
 
While there is overwhelming evidence of democracy as a preventive factor, some 
qualifications are necessary.  First, the democracy must be robust and fully-
functioning to offer the best protection.  The weak democracy of the 1920s Weimar 
Republic in Germany, for example, was easily disassembled by Hitler after taking 
office.  Second, universal enfranchisement is a key component of a robust 
democracy.   
 
Finally, there must be stability within the democratic system.  Nations transitioning 
to democracy, or in which democratic institutions are still developing, are actually at 
increased risk of extreme violence during the transition period.  According to the 
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political scientist Matthew Krain, for example, “the occurrence of openings in the 
political opportunity structure rather than the degree of concentration of power best 
predicts onset and differing degrees of severity of genocides and politicides.”35  
(Openings in the political structure are defined as occurring if “at least one of the 
following four factors changes: ‘the opening up of the access to participation, shifts 
in ruling alignments, the availability of influential allies, and cleavages within and 
among elites’”.36)  Thus the kinds of changes inherent within a transition to 
democracy can be perilous for nations at-risk of mass atrocities, although if they 
successfully transcend them, they are at substantially decreased risk.   
 
An awareness of these challenges, and frank discussion of them, may aid successful 
democratisation processes.  There are also opportunities for the international 
community to offer support to transitioning nations, thereby decreasing this risk.  
Such support might include independent mediators to enable conflictual pro-
democratisation forces to reach agreement on the format of the democratisation 
process, election observers to imbue the first elections with legitimacy, inducements 
for governments meeting democratisation milestones and the provision of legal 
expertise for the drafting of supporting legislation.  It might also include specific 
support for pro-democracy advocates and moderates within the nation.  Careful 
support for moderate voices, and context-specific programs, may be particularly 
effective in promoting peaceful transitions to democracy.   
 
In recognition of this, organisations such as the United Nations Democracy Fund 
(UNDEF) and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
have developed programs that promote and support democratic reform.  In 
Bangladesh, for example, UNDEF funds a project “to create conditions for more 
active civic engagement among rural and semi-urban poor citizens, and to build up 
the capacity of local government towards more accountable and effective 
governance.”37  A key goal of the project is to strengthen democracy in rural 
Bangladesh.38  Another initiative supported by UNDEF resulted in a book of essays 
focussing on “how African countries can promote and endorse the African Union’s 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.”39  EIDHR utilises civil society to 
support democracy and democratic reform.  For example, one project funded by 
EIDHR in 2009 supported the population in a number of regions in Georgia to 
develop societal capacity for “inclusion in democratic governance and political 
dialogue, in the political representation and decision-making processes at 
municipality level.”40  Such programs support democracies and democratisation at 
the local level, often providing assistance as nations seek to develop robust 
democracies.  This local approach may assist in managing and mitigating the risks 
associated with transitions to democratic government.    
 
Economic growth and economic stability 
 
Promoting equitable economic growth is an important protective factor in at-risk 
nations.41  Periods of economic distress have preceded many of the major genocides 
of the twentieth century – such as in Ottoman Turkey prior to the Armenian 
genocide, Germany prior to Hitler taking power, and Rwanda in the late 1980s.  
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Economic growth is typically advocated as a key structural prevention measure.  
Policies that promote economic growth can also be effective in direct prevention, as 
part of a package of measures to diffuse tensions in an escalating situation.   
 
Economic growth is particularly protective when it is equitable.  Horizontal inequity, 
and perceptions of horizontal inequity, can leave vulnerable minorities at continued 
risk, and continued disadvantage, even when overall economic growth in a nation 
appears healthy.  Furthermore, horizontal inequity has been shown, in at least some 
cases, to be positively associated with the occurrence of deadly ethno-communal 
violence.42  By contrast, equitable growth can contribute to breaking down the 
entrenched disadvantage experienced by vulnerable minorities, and thereby reduce 
their likelihood of falling victim to mass atrocities.   
 
While steady economic growth can have a protective effect, evidence also indicates 
that economic shocks can rapidly erode its influence as a stabilising factor.  Rwanda 
provides a strong example of this.  Rwanda’s economy suffered a major setback in 
the late 1980s as the price of its major export, coffee, plummeted.43  This quickly 
impacted on everything from maternal and infant mortality to the availability of 
imports such as toothpaste, and contributed to rising tensions in the nation.  The 
benefits of more than a decade of relatively steady economic growth, and significant 
improvements in poverty-alleviation in that time, rapidly disappeared.   
 
A nuanced analysis of the role of economic factors, therefore, might suggest that 
stable economic growth is more protective against conflict escalation than bursts of 
rapid economic growth.  This is supported by Harff’s finding that a low level of ‘trade 
openness’ is a significant predictor of future risk of genocide.44  Economic stability, 
therefore may be an important factor alongside relative economic development or 
poverty level.  An examination of historical instances of genocide, several of which 
have occurred in relatively affluent economies after a period of economic stress, is 
suggestive of the validity of this finding.  This suggests that there are many 
opportunities to work cooperatively with both less and more developed nations to 
advocate measures promoting economic stability as protective against genocide and 
mass atrocities.  Building protection against economic shocks, such as diversity in 
trade products and partners, and having measures available to cushion the blow of 
economic downturns (such as cash reserves or relatively low debt levels), may be 
particularly valuable as preventive measures.   
 
Development Assistance 
 
Poor countries lack the resources to address many of the causes of conflict.  
Development assistance can both directly and indirectly address these causes, 
through specific programs targeted towards mitigating points of conflict, or through 
wider economic strategies that reduce the competition for limited resources.   
Poverty reduction is recognised as an essential strategy for reducing conditions 
conducive to extreme violence, and one in which development assistance can play a 
major role.45  As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan remarked, “Every step taken 
towards reducing poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth ... is a step 
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toward conflict prevention.”46    While poverty itself is not a direct cause of genocide 
and mass atrocities, it can be a powerfully aggravating factor.  Well-designed and 
carefully implemented development assistance can assist in addressing inequities in 
the distribution of resources, widen access to opportunities, provide technical 
assistance, facilitate access to wider markets for produce, and facilitate economic 
development.47  Reducing poverty can mitigate the risk of mass atrocities in some of 
the poorest at-risk nations.   
 
Good Governance 
 
According to Gareth Evans, “Achieving good governance in all its manifestations – 
representative, responsive, accountable, and capable – is at the heart of effective 
long-term conflict and mass atrocity prevention.”48  Good governance includes 
promoting and supporting representative and accountable governments.49  In 
particular, governmental structures that spread authority and accountability across 
multiple levels of government – at national, regional and local levels – create barriers 
to the narrow concentrations of power that are common features of regimes that 
commit mass atrocities.50  Good governance also incorporates building international 
links, both economic and political, that increase participation in the global 
community.  Three key components of good governance can create additional 
barriers to extreme violence:  
 
Strengthening legal protections and judicial systems 
 
In at-risk nations, there is potential for minor and even accidental incidents of 
wrongdoing that cut across societal divisions to escalate into riots and public 
violence.  At times, such incidents are manipulated by political elites to be the 
‘trigger’ for massacres.  Effective judicial systems reduce both the desire and 
capacity of people to seek alternative or extralegal means to redress their 
grievances.  Issues can be addressed through recourse to a relatively impartial legal 
system, rather than through violent means.  Such a system may also contribute to 
reducing ethnic or religious polarisation.   
 
In cases in which there have been violent incidents, it is important that they are 
addressed through a robust legal system.  Impunity for ethnically, racially or 
religiously motivated violence effectively encourages the continuation and escalation 
of such violence.  This can occur at both the national and international level.  Prior to 
the Rwandan genocide, for example, Hutu extremists conducted a series of smaller, 
‘trial’ massacres of Tutsi, in part to gauge the response of their French ally.  
According to historian Gérard Prunier: 
 
The Hutu government ... did a bit of massacring in October 1990, then again 
in 1991 – small massacres of about 300 people at a time, nothing much 
compared to what would happen later.  Each time, they watched to see how 
the French were going to react.  The Hutu were pleased by France’s tolerance 
and understanding, and they began to raise the level of violence.  Had the 
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French made it clear that they did not support this extremism, the situation 
might not have deteriorated so badly.51 
 
The sociologist Vahakn Dadrian has also explored the role of the ‘legacy of impunity’ 
in shaping the events that led to the Armenian genocide.  According to Dadrian, 
Europe’s failure to impose any sanctions on the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the 
massacres of more than 100,000 Armenians in the 1890s, contributed to the 
subsequent Armenian genocide. 52  Ensuring rapid justice for aggressors within a 
nation after outbursts of violence, therefore, and ensuring international 
condemnation and efforts to secure this justice, is an important measure to curb an 
escalating cycle of violence.   
 
Strengthening legal protections for at-risk minorities is a further measure that 
creates barriers to their exclusion.  In the case of Botswana, for example, the 
indigenous San Bushman have been able to legally challenge their government’s 
attempts to remove them from their traditional homelands.  While this has been far 
from a panacea for the discriminatory measures they have endured, it has created 
real obstacles for the government’s relocation programme, and offered partial 
protection for the Bushmen.  Such barriers may also reduce the likelihood of 
discriminatory policies radicalising toward more extreme options.   
 
Legal protection is particularly important given that legal discrimination against 
targeted minorities has been identified as a precondition for genocide and mass 
atrocities.53  It is a very real opportunity for nations themselves to operationalise R2P 
under pillar one, by removing any discriminatory legislation.  This can be further 
enhanced through developing protective legislation and the ratification of relevant 
international conventions.  There are also substantial opportunities for regional 
organisations, neighbouring nations and NGOs to offer international assistance to 
nations undertaking this work, under pillar two of R2P.    
 
Security Sector Reform 
 
Security sector reform (SSR) is widely recognised as an important contributor to 
good governance and form of structural prevention.  As the Genocide Prevention 
Task Force report asserted, “Security sector reform – the effort to transform police, 
military, and other security forces into professional, rights-respecting services – may 
be one of the most direct and effective means of removing the capacity to commit 
atrocities.”54  A competent and disciplined security sector contributes to good 
governance, and promotes stability and trust in the state.55  SSR “focuses on building 
effective, accountable and sustainable security sectors that operate within a 
framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights.”56  SSR can involve 
changes to security sector legislation, separation of the security sector from political 
involvement, strengthening of police forces, reform of judicial and penal systems, 
reform of national security policies, and other measures that may be appropriate 
within specific contexts.   Institutionalising accountability is an essential component 
of this reform.  Military accountability, both legal and political, is vital to curbing 
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excesses and ensuring the military operates within the law. 57  Financial 
accountability is equally important to genuine reform.      
 
For many nations, embarking on a process of security sector reform may be a 
medium to long-term undertaking, with many incremental steps required in the 
process.  Such measures are to be encouraged as positive moves towards 
institutionalising policies in support of R2P.  There are many opportunities, too, for 
international cooperation and assistance in facilitating security sector reform in 
willing nations.  The UN has had numerous successes in promoting SSR, particularly 
in post-conflict zones, such as Kosovo.58  In other cases, there are very real 
challenges to convincing reluctant states to embark upon SSR, and to ensure that 
resulting changes are meaningful rather than rhetorical.  An incremental approach, 
that encourages the process to at least commence, may be helpful.  Additionally, 
regional organisations may be able to play a role in encouraging reform.  
 
 
A three pillar strategy to promote Security Sector Reform 
 
Pillar One 
Where appropriate, at-risk nations should be encouraged to pursue security sector 
reform as a method of structural prevention 
 
Pillar Two 
There are many opportunities for international cooperation and assistance in 
facilitating security sector reform in willing nations 
 
Pillar Three 
Security sector reform may be a component of peace agreements or disarmament 
agreements negotiated to forestall crisis situations 
 
   
Fighting Corruption 
 
Corruption is an insidious challenge to good governance.  It subverts the system 
from within, directing energy, resources and wealth towards the benefit of a small 
number of individuals rather than the state.  Corruption also reduces the impact of 
development or humanitarian assistance, has a negative impact on economic growth 
and leads to enormous wealth disparities.59  Perhaps its most damaging effect, 
however, is that it reduces trust in the mechanisms of the state, and the perceived 
legitimacy of the government itself.  So devastating are the effects of corruption that 
Evans has contended “No single rule of law issue is more important than the 
eradication of corruption.”60  Efforts to curb corruption are a key measure for the 
structural prevention of R2P crimes. 
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Promoting Civil Society and Civil Institutions 
 
Vibrant civil society organisations are “among the most elemental building blocks of 
a strong and just society.”61  Civil society organisations can take diverse forms, such 
as church groups, economic co-operatives, human rights organisations, niche 
interest groups and others.  They often promote inclusion and involvement of 
community members.  They may support the rights of women, promote education, 
or allow a community to work co-operatively to greater economic advantage.  
Empowerment of communities at this grass roots level can promote tolerance, 
lawfulness and be of real societal benefit.62  In societies with functional civil society 
organisations, and the freedom to create such organisations at will, individuals and 
communities have greater power to influence their own welfare and induce positive 
changes in their lives.  This may make them less susceptible to the kind of negative, 
exclusionary rhetoric of potential perpetrators.  At times, however, such 
organisations have played a role in promoting violence.   
 
There is mounting evidence of the benefit of promoting strong civil society 
organisations at the local level in particular.  The relative decentralisation of power 
forms a barrier to the high concentrations of power conducive to the perpetration of 
mass atrocities.  When some local needs are being met through local agency and 
local processes, “political struggle for control of the central government then 
becomes less critical.”63  In some circumstances, local civil society organisations with 
ethnically heterogeneous memberships can have important preventive roles in 
mitigating ethnic tensions and violence.64  In other societies, the ethnic 
heterogeneity or homogeneity of local civil society organisations appears less 
important than whether such organisations promote a sense of inclusion, 
community, and reflect democratic values.65  Nations can foster the development of 
civil society organisations as a pillar one measure, at relatively little cost.  External 
actors, such as other nations, NGOs and even intergovernmental organisations can 
aid this process substantially under pillar two, with an appropriate context-sensitive 
approach.  Fostering civil society organisations, therefore, is a valuable protective 
measure of structural prevention.   
 
Educating for Tolerance 
 
Developing and implementing education programs that promote tolerance and 
compassion towards others is an important way to promote generational attitudinal 
changes that can reduce the likelihood of genocide and mass atrocities.66  Certainly 
this is a strategy that requires a long-term commitment.  Yet historical research 
suggests that risk of genocide or mass atrocities is often recognisable literally 
decades in advance.67  The potential for genocide in Rwanda, for example, was 
clearly articulated by area specialists as early as the 1960s. 68  Similarly, the risk of 
the state-sponsored extermination of the Armenian minority in the Ottoman Empire 
was widely discussed by experts for more than twenty years prior to the Armenian 
genocide.69  These timelines indicate that there is ample opportunity for educational 
programs to have an impact in at-risk nations.   
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Programs that promote tolerance and compassion may empower communities to 
resist the incitement and propaganda that typically precede mass atrocities, and 
even to demand its cessation.  Proponents of education as a strategy for structural 
prevention are cognizant of the wide-reaching cultural changes required.  The 
psychologist Ervin Staub acknowledged:  
 
To create a non-violent world we will have to change cultures and social 
institutions which carry the devaluation of others, maintain discrimination, 
emphasise obedience to authority, whether benevolent or destructive, and in 
other ways provide the structures that lead to violence ... what caring 
children learn must be an inclusive caring, that is also applied to people 
outside the group, to all human beings.70   
 
There is evidence that such cultural change could be highly effective.  Studies of 
individuals who rescued others during the Holocaust suggest they are distinguishable 
by specific traits that may be educable.  That is, they possess great empathy for the 
suffering of others and feel a greater sense of inclusiveness – “a tendency to feel 
connected to diverse people and groups.”71  Rather than seeing themselves 
essentially as Poles, or Germans, or Catholics, they had a sense of shared humanity 
with all people.72  They also possess a high internal locus of control.73  That is, they 
are people who feel that they, individually, can make a difference.  As a result, they 
do.  Through their heroism, these rescuers have demonstrated the kinds of values 
societies can teach their children to protect against risk of mass atrocities.   
 
UNESCO has demonstrated the possibilities of targeting programs to “foster a 
culture of peace through education.”74  According to the UN, “the culture of peace is 
a set of values, attitudes, modes and behaviour and ways of life that reject violence 
and prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through 
dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations.”75  UNESCO has 
sought to promote a culture of peace through promoting education-based 
strategies: “revising ... educational curricula to promote qualitative values, attitudes 
and behaviours of a culture of peace, including peaceful conflict-resolution, dialogue, 
consensus-building and active non-violence ... [to] promote respect for all human 
rights ... foster democratic participation ... advance understanding, tolerance and 
solidarity ... *and+ promote international peace and security.”76  These kinds of 
strategies can be further developed to specifically target the prevention of genocide 
and mass atrocities.   
 
Programs to Combat the Political Manipulation of Ethnic Tensions 
 
The politicisation of ethnic tensions has been identified as a key indicator of risk of 
genocide and mass atrocities.77  Societal divisions may be manipulated by political 
elites during times of difficulty or internal strife, either as a distraction from other 
issues, or to provide a scapegoat for the difficulties.  Such manipulation is 
particularly dangerous in societies in which there are already additional risk factors 
for mass atrocities present.  They can contribute to polarisation, to incitement to 
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violence in the media, and to a cascade of escalating tensions that culminates in 
deadly violence.  
 
Strategies that seek to reduce, eliminate or combat the political manipulation of 
ethnic tensions, therefore, have substantial potential to inhibit the processes of risk 
escalation.  Programs that directly target politicians and government officials may be 
particularly helpful.  Many may not be aware of the potential dangers of politicising 
ethnic and other societal cleavages, or their own possible culpability in the process.  
Furthermore, when politicians speak directly on this issue, there is evidence it can be 
very effective.  For example, Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev has repeatedly 
reinforced the value of national unity in the ethnically diverse nation, even as it has 
been affected by the recent economic downturn.  It may even be possible to work 
with at-risk nations to get broad agreement across the political spectrum to refrain 
from using polarising rhetoric.  Such agreement, if it could be obtained, would be a 
powerful inhibitor of risk escalation.  
 
More broadly, educational programs directly focussed on this issue could target both 
adults and school children.  Assisting populations to identify divisive rhetoric, and to 
think critically about the messages being presented, empowers communities to 
reject this kind of political discourse.  A key component of such programs would be 
to incorporate discussions of the potential consequences of identity politics.  As the 
UN Secretary-General has recognised, education that promotes “a political culture 
that favours tolerance, dialogue and mobility over the rigidities and injustices of 
identity politics,” can further the objectives of the Responsibility to Protect.78 
 
Promotion of Human Rights 
 
Ongoing efforts to promote human rights at the national, regional and international 
levels can contribute to the prevention of mass atrocities.  Within nations, human 
rights institutions may be able to advocate to government on human rights issues, 
offer oversight and negative publicity concerning human rights violations, and may 
contribute to ensuring human rights continue to be part of the political agenda.  
Ideally, every nation should have its own national human rights institution that is 
compliant with the standards agreed upon in the Paris Principles.79 
 
At the regional level, human rights organisations can inform discussion of regional 
issues and promote the ongoing importance of respecting human rights.  In nations 
where there are human rights violations, they may be able to advocate for policy 
changes.  The ASEAN Inter-Governmental Commission on Human Rights, for 
example, has recently been established within ASEAN to consider human rights 
issues, although with somewhat limited terms of reference.  International human 
rights organisations can also contribute to placing pressure on nations in which 
human rights violations are occurring.  The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), in 
particular, can address and make recommendations to the General Assembly with 
respect to human rights violations in individual nations.  It can also promote human 
rights more generally, offer advisory services, and assist with capacity-building.80  
Importantly, it can also promote efforts to ensure nations sign and implement 
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international human rights agreements, and enact appropriate domestic legislation 
in support of human rights.   
 
Promotion of human rights in these ways can have an important impact at the 
international level.  Continued reference to human rights highlights to all nations 
that human rights issues are not separate from political and economic issues, but an 
integral part of international relations.  It also serves as a reminder that human 
rights are at the very heart of the UN Charter, and of the link between human rights 
and sovereignty.81  In the current age of globalisation, ensuring that consideration of 
human rights is integrated into international relations can contribute to increasing 
respect for them.     
 
Develop the Capacity of the United Nations to respond to potential R2P Crimes 
 
The United Nations must be considered as both tool and artisan in operationalising 
the responsibility to prevent.  Unique in its universal legitimacy, it “is unquestionably 
the principal institution for building, consolidating and using the authority of the 
international community.” 82  Furthermore, the prevention of mass atrocities is 
fundamental to its agenda.  As Secretary-General Annan affirmed in 2004:  
There can be no more important issue, and no more binding obligation, that 
the prevention of genocide.  Indeed, this may be considered one of the 
original purposes of the United Nations.83   
 
The rhetoric, however, is in stark contrast to the way in which the United Nations 
has responded to genocide and mass atrocities in the past, such as the genocides in 
Rwanda and Bosnia.  As the political scientist Adam Jones devastatingly yet 
accurately commented: “The UN has an abysmal record in confronting and 
forestalling genocide.”84  In recognition of this, the United Nations has recently 
sought to improve its capacity to respond, through the appointment of the Special 
Advisors for the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect.  Yet it was 
forced to acknowledge that in 2009, nine years after the release of the official 
reports on UN actions during the Rwandan genocide and the fall of Srebrenica, 
“many of their institutional recommendations, including on early warning, analysis 
and training, have not been fully implemented ... The United Nations and its 
Member States remain underprepared to meet their most fundamental prevention 
and protection responsibilities.”85  Implementing the recommendations of these 
reports is crucial to learning the lessons offered by the tragic failures in Rwanda and 
Bosnia, and would be a meaningful way in which to improve UN capacity to prevent 
mass atrocities.   
 
Improving the capacity of the UN to prevent and respond to R2P crimes, and 
particularly in a “timely and decisive manner” is fundamental to the 
operationalisation of the Responsibility to Protect.  In recognition of this, the Asia-
Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect is currently preparing a more detailed 
report on the current and potential capacity of the United Nations to prevent 
genocide and mass atrocities, to be released in mid-2010.   
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Develop the capacity of regional organisations to contribute to prevention 
 
Regional organisations can play a major role in mitigating the risk of mass atrocity 
crimes.  Regional actors may be particularly motivated by the practical consequences 
of inaction – for example, large refugee flows or the potential destabilising impact 
that extreme violence can have regionally.  The will to act may be augmented by a 
depth of local knowledge that can facilitate positive outcomes.  Additionally, regional 
organisations may be able to exert specific influence, or leverage their relationship 
with the relevant nation(s) in order to positively impact upon a high-risk situation.   
The great potential for regional organisations to prevent the kinds of conflict that 
can lead to mass atrocities has been demonstrated through the actions of the 
OSCE.86  In particular, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities has been 
credited with stopping “as many as a dozen major ethnic and language-based 
conflicts from breaking out across Central and Eastern Europe, from the Baltics to 
Romania.”87  Developing similar capacity for preventive diplomacy in other regional 
organisations could be of tremendous benefit as a structural prevention strategy 
aimed at preventing R2P crimes.   
 
Regional organisations have also demonstrated leadership in circumstances where 
direct prevention, or reaction, has been required.  The engagement of the African 
Union (AU) in potential and actual instances of mass atrocities in Africa is a reflection 
of the AU’s commitment to ‘non-indifference’ rather than ‘non-interference’.88  The 
AU-mandated Panel of Eminent African Personalities, led by former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, for example, had substantial success in calming the unrest in 
Kenya following the disputed December 2007 presidential election.89 The Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has also been an effective regional 
organisation in support of human security.  Regional organisations, therefore, can be 
utilised very effectively in support of the responsibility to protect.  Developing 
capacity within such organisations – particularly capacity for preventive diplomacy – 
and facilitating learning between such organisations, can contribute to mitigating the 
risk of genocide and mass atrocities.  
 
Deterrence as a form of Prevention 
 
A credible threat of punishment for potential organisers and perpetrators of mass 
atrocities may act as a deterrent to their commission.  In the past, perpetrators of 
mass atrocities have often not been held accountable for their crimes.  Former UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, José Ayala Lasso, once remarked “A person 
stands a better chance of being tried and judged for killing one human being than for 
killing 100,000.”90  In the wake of the mass atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda in the 1900s, ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals were established to 
bring to justice some of the leading perpetrators in each case.  Subsequently, the 
International Criminal Court has been established as a permanent body.  Effective 
deterrence was a primary objective of the court’s establishment: 
 
Once it is clear that the international community will no longer tolerate such 
monstrous acts without assigning responsibility and meting out appropriate 
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punishment – to heads of State and commanding officers as well as to the lowliest 
soldiers in the field or militia recruits – it is hoped that those who would incite a 
genocide; embark on a campaign of ethnic cleansing; murder, rape and brutalize 
civilians caught in an armed conflict; or use children for barbarous medical 
experiments will no longer find willing helpers.
 91 
 
There is some evidence of early success in this regard.  In Côte d’Ivoire in November 
2004, for example, “where xenophobic hate speech had exacerbated domestic 
tensions and spurred further violence,” then Special Advisor on the Prevention of 
Genocide Juan Méndez “reminded” authorities there “that they could be held 
criminally responsible for the consequences.”92  According to a UN press release on 
15 November 2004:  
 
Mr. Mendez said today Ivorian authorities had an obligation to end impunity and 
curb public expression of racial or religious hatred, warning that in the absence of 
effective action such incitement can be referred to the ICC.   
He recommended that national authorities put an immediate end to the 
propagation of hate speech and media-induced violence through official outlets, 
aggressively prosecute all acts of violence and incitement, and recommit themselves 
to the ceasefire accords that ended the fighting two years ago between the 
government in the south and rebels in the north.   
 
Within a short time, the rhetoric had moderated.93  At best however, the deterrent 
effect of a credible threat of punishment can only be one strategy within a suite of 
measures.    
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7.  Strategies for Direct Prevention
 
 
Strategies for Direct Prevention 
 
Preventive Diplomacy 
         Mediation 
         Quiet Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy 
 
Positive Inducements 
 
Aid Conditionality 
 
Economic Sanctions 
        Targeted Sanctions 
 
Arms Embargoes 
 
Work with religious institutions to eschew violence 
        Interfaith Dialogue 
 
Respond decisively to limited outbreaks of violence and human rights concerns 
 
Undertake work to resolve/ameliorate refugee and IDP issues 
 
Media-based Strategies 
       Disrupting incitement in the media 
       Utilising the Media at the earliest opportunity 
       Utilising the media as a tool to promote public engagement with R2P 
 
 
 
Preventive Diplomacy 
 
Preventive diplomacy is a key measure in the prevention of genocide and mass 
atrocities.  Indeed, it is so central to prevention that the Genocide Prevention Task 
Force devoted an entire chapter to it.94  Their central recommendation, to create a 
new high-level interagency body in the US – an Atrocities Prevention Committee – 
dedicated to responding to threats of genocide and mass atrocities, may also be 
appropriate for the European Union, other nations and intergovernmental 
organisations to consider.95  Dedicated capacity to monitoring nations deemed at 
medium to high risk of mass atrocities, and direct lines of communication with the 
highest levels of government, could substantially augment the international 
community’s ability to prevent and respond to emerging R2P crises.96 
 
Preventive diplomacy is worthy of a central position in the direct prevention arsenal 
as one of its most effective strategies.  According to the Human Security Report 
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2005, the “80% decline in the most deadly civil conflicts numbers that has taken 
place since the early 1990s” is primarily attributable to “the extraordinary upsurge of 
activism by the international community that has been directed toward conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding.”97  A critical component of this, 
according to the report, is “a dramatic increase in preventive diplomacy”.98  By 
preventing latent conflicts from escalating into warfare, the cascade of events that 
can lead to extreme violence is interrupted.  The close relationship between war and 
mass atrocity crimes – with 16 out of 17 mass atrocities recorded in Africa in one 
study occurring in countries at war, for example – reveals the critical importance of 
preventing conflict as a measure of R2P.99   
 
Mediation 
 
In Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
highlighted the importance of indigenous mediation capacity.  “Building capacities 
for inclusive and participatory processes of dialogue” and local dispute resolution 
capacity are critical components of the responsibility to prevent.100  Developing 
these capacities could be an important pillar one measure toward operationalising 
the Responsibility to Protect for individual nations.  There is also a major role for 
international assistance in such endeavours, under pillar two of R2P.  Neighbouring 
nations can be highly effective mediators, bringing local expertise and wisdom to the 
negotiating table.  At times, however, it may be preferable to the parties involved to 
have a non-neighbouring nation – with few perceived interests in the conflict – as a 
relatively neutral third party participant.  Intergovernmental organisations, regional 
organisations and nongovernmental organisations can also be invaluable in 
diplomatic endeavours. 
 
Quiet Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy 
 
Preventive diplomacy can adopt variable forms.  ‘Quiet diplomacy’, with its discreet 
and respectful approach, can be persuasive in changing regime-behaviour.  The 
analyst John Heidenrich has suggested quiet diplomacy is best suited to relatively 
early-stage conflict prevention, however, and unlikely to be singularly sufficient in 
dissuading a nation already contemplating genocide or mass atrocity crimes.101  
More public diplomacy can place both internal and external pressure upon regimes 
to change undesirable behaviours.  Sometimes friendly – and not so friendly – 
warnings can hint at the consequences of non-compliance.  Such warnings much be 
credible and plausible to be effective, however.102  Official efforts at preventive 
diplomacy can be augmented by private sector, or ‘track two’ diplomacy.103  A united 
approach, by the United Nations or regional organisations, can also place 
multilateral pressure on a nation to desist from behaviours that might facilitate or 
lead to mass atrocity crimes.   
 
Preventive diplomacy is a multifaceted tool that can be utilised in different ways and 
by different actors to halt and even reverse escalating situations.  It represents one 
of the most powerful tools – and best opportunities – for R2P to succeed in the 
‘responsibility to prevent’.  For this reason, endeavours to build capacity in this area 
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may be of particular value.  The OSCE, for example, provides an excellent model for 
other regional organisations to follow in developing capacity for non-violent conflict 
resolution at the regional level.  Such capacity could also be developed at the 
national level in at-risk nations, through the establishment of centres promoting 
peaceful relations between groups, and offering mediation and conflict resolution 
processes.  National human rights institutions may be able to offer such services.  
The UN Institute for Teaching and Research (UNITAR) offers advanced training in 
conflict analysis, negotiation and mediation skills that could be utilised to further 
such programs.  Ensuring the ready availability of methods for non-violent conflict 
resolution facilitates their use in times of tension.   
 
Positive Inducements 
 
Positive Inducements, or economic incentives, can be quite effective as a measure to 
promote specific policy or behavioural adjustments by an at-risk nation, in exchange 
for political or economic benefit.104  They have been successfully utilised in the past, 
for example, to facilitate the Ukraine to relinquish its nuclear arsenal.105  Typically, 
they are used as a tool in international negotiating processes, often with a major 
power offering the inducement.  In these circumstances, a government may be 
persuaded to grant civil rights for its minorities, to pursue demilitarisation policies, 
or to comply with a civil-war settlement.  In return it may be granted favourable 
trading terms, purchase agreements, economic or military aid, military cooperation, 
access to technology or expertise, investment, or a package of multiple 
inducements.106  Inducements can foster goodwill and cooperation.107  They appear 
to be most successful when utilised at an early stage of prevention, and from a 
position of strength.108    While they are relatively under-examined compared to 
sanctions, they are an important diplomatic tool with a strong record of success.  
Under pillar two, they can be used in conjunction with other measures such as 
preventive diplomacy to promote policies and practices conducive to R2P in at-risk 
nations.   
 
Aid Conditionality 
 
Aid conditionality ties the provision of developmental assistance to desired 
commitments or outcomes in the recipient nation.  Such assistance may be linked to 
meeting democratisation targets or to human rights goals.  In nations dependent on 
substantial external financial assistance, there is evidence it can lead to behavioural 
changes.109  For example, when French President François Mitterrand announced in 
June 1990 that future economic aid to African states would be linked to multiparty 
democracy, Rwandan reliance on French foreign aid meant it had little choice but to 
commence reforms to its one-party rule.110  A month after Mitterrand’s speech, 
Rwandan President Habyarimana “suddenly declared that he supported a multiparty 
system.”111  Yet aid conditionality is controversial.  As Evans has elucidated, there are 
ethical concerns regarding the withholding of assistance to populations ruled by a 
recalcitrant regime.112  Moreover, there are concerns as to whether the resultant 
changes reflect a genuine commitment by the recipient regime.  In the Rwandan 
case, for example, Habyarimana arguably delayed any real change by simply 
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appointing a Commission to make recommendations regarding the democratisation 
process.113  As a result, new types of aid conditionality have been developed in 
recent years.  The European Commission, for example, has developed programs of 
performance-based conditionality, in which disbursement of aid is linked to the 
achievement of objectives.114  Indicators include those in the areas of budgetary 
management, health and education, and partial achievement is rewarded with 
partial disbursement of funds.115  Used carefully and cooperatively, aid conditionality 
may be a very useful strategy to meet specific goals supportive of R2P.     
 
Economic Sanctions 
 
Sanctions have been widely used as a coercive tool in recent decades.  In particular, 
they have been used in a number of cases of potential or actual genocide, such as 
the UN and OSCE sanctions imposed against the former Yugoslavia (1991) and the 
UN sanctions against Rwanda (1994).116 Their effectiveness as a policy response for 
R2P, however, is questionable.  There are instances where sanctions appear to have 
been persuasive against rogue states, such as in apartheid South Africa.117  Yet the 
preponderance of evidence with respect to mass atrocity crimes suggests “that 
sanctions, not unlike other measures of international diplomacy or coercion, do little 
to deter genocide when it is in the offing and are ineffective at halting it when it is 
occurring.”118  Furthermore, according to the political scientist George Lopez, general 
sanctions can substantially contribute to a deterioration of human rights in nations 
at risk of mass atrocities, “creating a favourable climate for genocide.”119  According 
to the Executive Office of the Secretary General, “The only real disagreement in the 
contemporary sanction literature relates to the degree to which sanctions fail as an 
instrument for coercing changes in the behaviour of target states.”120   
 
Targeted Sanctions 
 
As an attempt to improve the efficacy of sanctions and reduce their humanitarian 
cost, the United Nations has recently focussed on targeted, or selective sanctions as 
a more refined coercive measure.  Targeted sanctions “offer a way to focus the 
penalty more directly on those most responsible for the crisis.”121  They may involve 
asset freezes, travel restrictions for individuals or members of the targeted 
government, a ban from participation in international organisations, or a ban on 
dealing with companies from a particularly nation.122  They may involve restrictions 
on specific types of trade that generate income for the targeted government, such as 
oil, diamonds or logging.  While targeted sanctions are not a panacea, carefully 
designed sanctions, utilised as part of a package of measures, may be effective in 
inducing policy change in targeted nations.  Nevertheless, their history of being “too 
little and too late in dealing with genocide and near-genocidal occurrences” suggests 
they may be of somewhat limited utility for R2P.123   
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Arms Embargoes 
 
Arms embargoes are a targeted sanction touted as “an important tool of the Security 
Council and the international community when conflict arises or is threatened.”124  
Yet evidence suggests that they have not always been successful with respect to R2P 
crimes in the past.125  The case of Angola, however, stands out as a good example of 
how embargoes might usefully assist the protection of populations.  After several 
years of ineffective implementation, the Security Council began to name and shame 
countries that violated the Angolan arms embargo.  Implementation was 
strengthened as a result of Council oversight, gradually starving UNITA of arms, 
paving the way for their military defeat and the end of conflict. There is some 
evidence that arms embargoes can be effective in certain circumstances, however, 
and that with better enforcement they have the potential to be powerful tools.  
Studies on the effectiveness of arms embargoes have found that their flaws centre 
around failures of implementation.126  For example, control in the trade of small 
arms has been difficult to achieve despite arms embargoes, due to a lack of domestic 
legislation to prosecute those involved in small arms trade with nations subject to 
arms embargoes, and a lack of UN resources and capacity to police arms 
embargoes.127  These issues are ongoing, but there may be opportunities for future 
improvement.  In cases where there has been enforcement, there is evidence that 
arms embargoes can be effective.  The arms embargo on Côte d’Ivoire, for example, 
is credited with helping “to stymie the descent into civil war there”, in circumstances 
where the eruption of genocide was widely feared.128  Alongside the arms embargo 
in Côte d’Ivoire, however, was a large deployment of UN peacekeepers.  In the 
absence of such a presence, it is unclear that such a positive outcome is achievable.   
However, arms embargoes can also prove counter-productive as demonstrated by 
the case of Bosnia.  In this case, a UN-imposed arms embargo prevented the newly 
independent Bosnia-Herzegovina from acquiring arms to defend itself from 
Milosevic’s Yugoslavia.129  A subsequent examination of the impact of this embargo 
by International Court of Justice Judge Elihu Lauterpacht found a “direct link ... 
between the continuation of the arms embargo and the exposure of the Muslim 
population of Bosnia to genocidal activity at the hands of the Serbs.”130   
 
Goals such as limiting the arms available to potentially genocidal regimes, and 
controlling the illegal trade in small arms that often end up in the hands of their 
militias, are highly laudable.  The chequered history of arms embargoes, however, 
highlights the negative consequences of embargoes that are not adequately 
enforced or enforceable.  Arms embargoes, therefore, need to be considered very 
carefully as a tool with real potential to do harm to the very vulnerable populations 
they are ostensibly employed to protect.  Moreover, they cannot be considered in 
isolation.  The smuggling of illegal arms, the availability of small arms to purchase 
(legally or illegally), the existence of armed militias and the use of child soldiers can 
all impact on the effectiveness of arms embargoes.   
 
 
 
 
The Responsibility to Prevent:   Opportunities, Challlenges and Strategies for Operationalisation 
 
35 
Work with religious institutions to eschew violence 
 
Religious institutions occupy a unique position within society.  As a powerful voice 
for the supremacy of morality, they have the opportunity to play a vital role in a 
number of ways.  At times this role has been a very active one, as missionaries, 
religious leaders and lay persons have acted to thwart atrocities in line with their 
religious precepts.  Human Rights organisations such as Operation Broken Silence (a 
Christian organisation), Jewish World Watch and Save Darfur (an alliance including 
multiple faith-based organisations) demonstrate the refusal of religious 
organisations to be passive bystanders to genocide and mass atrocities in the 
modern world.  Other organisations, such as Islamic Relief WorldWide and Tzu Chi 
(Buddhist Compassionate Relief) Foundation have adopted a broad agenda of 
humanitarian activities in support of a peaceable agenda.    
 
Interfaith Dialogue 
 
Interfaith dialogue is a means through which religious organisations can promote 
understanding and reconciliation between divided groups within a society.  Religion 
is commonly a contributing factor in conflicts, and interfaith dialogue can work to 
reduce this source of discord.  Interfaith dialogue can be utilised successfully in 
diverse ways.  High-level interfaith dialogue can propel religious leaders to issue joint 
statements advocating for peaceful intergroup relations.131  According to interfaith 
advocate David Smock, “The focus is joint action on behalf of peace.  This can be 
particularly effectively where religious divisions are among the sources of societal 
division and conflict.”132  Interfaith bodies may also have the capacity to conduct 
mediation between opposing groups in conflict situations, as did the Interreligious 
Council in Sierra Leone.133  At the grassroots level, interfaith dialogue can open 
communications between diverse groups in a society, and facilitate greater 
understanding of, and empathy towards them. 
 
Respond decisively to limited outbreaks of violence and human rights concerns 
 
The interplay of strategic and moral issues at the international level frequently sees 
strategic imperatives prioritised over human rights concerns.  Political leaders often 
refrain from commenting upon the human rights records of their neighbours or allies 
for fear of the negative impact it may have on relations.  Certainly there is an 
appropriate place for pursuing peaceable international relations.  Yet repeatedly 
‘overlooking’ issues of concern can be a costly strategy.  Evidence demonstrates that 
failure to respond emphatically to dangerous rhetoric, limited outbreaks of ethnic 
violence and the like not only allows it to continue, but facilitates its escalation.  
Ultimately, this can have very serious consequences.   
 
There are many examples of how the failure to react decisively facilitates an 
escalating cycle of violence.  Often this process can be traced through decades of 
international relations.  Prior to the Armenian genocide, for example, diplomatic 
relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers of Europe were 
littered with more than two decades of correspondence in which the international 
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community was unwilling to decisively condemn or respond to repeated outbreaks 
of massacres there.  In 1895 the English observer Reverend MacColl commented 
astutely:  
 
The impunity which the Porte [Ottoman government] has enjoyed for the 
horrors of [the massacre at] Sassun has encouraged the Sultan and his 
advisors to organise a crescentade [sic] in Asia Minor; and I have good 
evidence for saying that if Europe do not intervene speedily, the Armenian 
question will soon be settled by the extermination of the Armenians.134  
 
Similarly, the French toleration of massacres of Tutsi in Rwanda in the 1990s 
(discussed earlier in Section Three of this report) facilitated the subsequent 
genocide.  This built on an earlier history of the international community failing to 
respond decisively to massacres of Tutsi in Rwanda in December 1963 and January 
1964.   
 
More recently, events in Kenya demonstrate the dangers of this approach to 
international relations.  While the international efforts to quell the post-election 
violence in Kenya in 2007 have been hailed as a successful utilisation of R2P, it is 
important recognise that this violence was partly enabled by the international 
community’s failure to respond to earlier outbreaks of ethnic violence there.  Since 
1991, several thousand Kenyans have been killed and many thousands more 
displaced by a series of violent incidents.135  The violence is regularly linked with the 
electoral cycle.136  Yet international actors repeatedly failed to properly condemn the 
violence, or acknowledge the role of Kenya’s government in its instigation.137  This 
facilitated further use of violence as a successful political strategy.  By contrast, had 
international donors followed the example of the Dutch in the 1990s, and cut aid to 
the Kenyan government in response to its human rights record and governance 
issues, it may have made this strategy far more costly for the government to 
consider in subsequent elections.138  A previous suspension of some development 
assistance in 1991 – in response to corruption and to provoke the liberalisation of 
the political system – led to reform within weeks.139  This suggests the potential for 
the success of a concerted response in dissuading the Kenyan government from 
using or allowing such violence.   
 
The three examples of Ottoman Turkey, Rwanda and Kenya demonstrate that 
international responses that endorse, overlook or otherwise fail to decisively 
condemn ethnic violence create conditions to future explosions and escalation.  
Moreover, when only some members of the international community speak out, it 
can often be the silence of key powers or allies that is heard most loudly.  Early, 
decisive and united international engagement has real potential as an inhibitor of 
the escalating cycles of violence that can lead to genocide and mass atrocities.  
 
Undertake work to resolve/ameliorate refugee and IDP issues 
 
Presently, there are almost 42 million refugees globally.140  As Refugees International 
has noted, “Refugee crises left unattended threaten stability around the world.” 141  
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Nowhere is this more apparent than in Central Africa.  In Rwanda, ethnic violence 
associated with the decolonisation process in the early 1960s led to approximately 
100,000 refugees scattered around its borders at independence.142  Refugee 
incursions sparked the massacres in 1963-64.  In 1990, it was second generation 
refugees from the independence process that invaded Rwanda as the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front, seeking repatriation and reintegration.  This contributed to the 
destabilisation of Rwanda that ultimately led to the genocide.  Post-genocide, 
massive refugee flows have destabilised the entire region and contributed to civil 
war and violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  The entire region is still 
suffering the impact of this today.   
 
The UNHCR’s Brian Barbour and Brian Gorlick suggest “there may be no easier way 
for the international community to meet its responsibility to protect than by 
providing asylum and other international protection on adequate terms.”143  While 
acknowledging the complexities and difficulties of this issue, they suggest “the grant 
of asylum is, or would be in many cases, the most practical, realistic and least 
controversial response to assisting victims of mass atrocities.”144   
 
While there are already substantial efforts to address refugee issues, most notably 
by the UNHCR, there are many opportunities for further work in this area.  UNHCR 
notes that repatriation of refugees to their homelands, resettlement when 
repatriation is impossible, and local integration of refugees into their host 
community can all offer durable solutions for refugees.145  But for many millions of 
refugees, none of these solutions are presently possible.  Greater international 
cooperation, and greater willingness of nations to accept larger numbers of refugees 
could aid in resolving this issue.  Expert analysis of specific refugee issues can offer 
additional insight in resolving particular cases.  Effective resolution of refugee crises 
can substantially reduce the likelihood of mass atrocities crimes.  As Refugees 
International have noted, “timely responses to refugee crises can increase stability in 
a region before the conflict spreads across borders.”146   
 
Media-based Strategies 
 
The media has often played a key role in the progression of mass atrocities and 
situations of potential mass atrocity.  It is unique in its capacity to both facilitate and 
inhibit extreme violence.  Appropriate awareness and management of the role of the 
media, therefore, is an important tool in the R2P prevention arsenal.   
 
Disrupting incitement in the media 
 
The role of media in ‘incitement’ to mass violence has been well-documented.  In 
historical instances of genocide, such as the Holocaust and Rwanda, the media has 
been utilised by perpetrators as a vital tool for the dissemination of propaganda.  
Nazi propaganda, disseminated through films, newspapers, printed cartoons and 
even children’s story books presented the Jews as subhuman, inferior, vermin and a 
dangerous threat to Germany that must be destroyed.  As one propagandist 
newsletter stated:  
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Who believes that a parasite (e.g., a louse) can be improved or changed? . . . 
We can only choose between being devoured by the parasite or destroying it. 
The Jew must be destroyed wherever we meet him! In doing so, we commit 
no crime against life, rather serve life’s laws of struggle, which always oppose 
that which is an enemy to healthy life.147 
 
Similar techniques and messages were utilised in the propaganda prior to the 
Rwandan genocide.148  Thus in March 1993 the fortnightly publication Kangura 
proclaimed:  
 
A cockroach gives birth to a cockroach ... the history of Rwanda shows us 
clearly that a Tutsi stays always exactly the same, that he has never changed 
... the inyenzi [literally cockroaches, but used to refer to the Tutsi] who 
attacked in October 1990 and those of the 1960s are all linked ... their 
evilness is the same.”149 
 
The centrality of propaganda, and its wide dissemination via the media, is such that 
numerous models of the preconditions for genocide include it as a key marker on the 
path towards extreme violence.150  ‘Incitement’ has also been suggested as a trigger 
point for intervention.151  Strategies that interrupt this process, therefore, make it 
more difficult for perpetrators to pursue their violent intentions.  
 
The kinds of strategies needed to subvert the effects of incitement and propaganda 
in nations at risk of mass atrocities are likely to be fairly case-specific.  In the wake of 
the Rwandan genocide, for example, the United States was heavily criticised for 
having the ability to, but refraining from, jamming the ‘hate radio’ that dominated 
Rwanda in the lead up to and during the genocide.  By contrast, what has been 
dubbed the “ring about Serbia”, that is multiple Serbian-language radio broadcasts 
from neighbouring states, is crediting with most likely helping to topple Serbian 
President Slobodan Milosevic in 2000.152  Media-based strategies have probably 
been under-utilised as direct prevention measures in high-risk situations, but given 
the importance of incitement and propaganda in the lead up to mass atrocities they 
are well worth consideration.   
 
Utilising the media at the earliest opportunity 
 
A free and independent media can be an important component of structural 
prevention measures to prevent mass atrocities.  As the Genocide Prevention Task 
Force report commented, “Free and responsible media are critical to ensuring that 
both citizens and governing elites are well informed and that citizens are able to hold 
their government accountable.”153  In nations identified as at some risk of mass 
atrocities, particular attention should be given to promoting ethical media reporting.  
The way in which intergroup tensions are reported can have a profound impact on 
how they are interpreted by the wider public.  Moreover, the kind and amount of 
attention given to intergroup issues can influence their predominance as a political 
issue.  Beyond ensuring the structures and organs of a free and independent media 
are developed or maintained in at-risk nations, programs that specifically target 
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media personnel as to their role in this regard could be an important aspect of 
structural or direction prevention.  
 
Utilising the media as a tool to promote public engagement with R2P 
 
The media can play a vital positive role in preventing genocide and mass atrocities 
through alerting the public to situations of high risk and outbreaks of violence, and 
through promoting public engagement with issues surrounding R2P.  Many human 
rights organisations, particularly in the western world, rely heavily on the media to 
publicise crises and assist in rallying support for their causes.  Genocide Intervention 
Network and Amnesty International, for example, utilise the media in their efforts to 
mount ‘grassroots’ campaigns to pressure governments to respond to mass 
atrocities.  According to the Executive Director of Amnesty International USA, 
William Schulz, “If mass atrocities are therefore to be met with more than rhetoric 
and if the ‘responsibility to protect (R2P)’ is to become more than a slogan, popular 
outrage will need to outflank governmental reluctance.”154  The media can play a 
vital role in all stages of this process.  
  
 
Utilising Media-based strategies across the three pillars 
 
Pillar One 
At-risk nations should be encouraged to institutionalise a free and independent 
media with appropriate legal protections 
At-risk nations can develop and support efforts that use the media to promote 
positive intergroup relations  
 
Pillar Two 
There are opportunities for international assistance to enable nations to develop 
appropriate legal and constitutional protections for an independent media 
NGOs may be able to assist by offering programs to train media personnel in ethical 
reporting of intergroup relations 
 
Pillar Three 
The international community can subvert the effects of propaganda and incitement 
by making alternative messages accessible to affected populations via appropriate 
mechanisms 
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8.  Late-Stage Direct Prevention Strategies
 
 
 
Late-Stage Direct Prevention Strategies 
 
Surveillance 
 
The Imposition of ‘No-fly’ Zones 
 
The Questionable Value of ‘Safe Areas’  
 
Peacekeeping Missions 
 
Opening Borders 
 
 
Surveillance 
 
The historian Christopher Walker once described World War One as providing “a 
thick black velvet arras, behind which the Young Turks could act with impunity.”155  
While he invoked this evocative image metaphorically, recent technological 
developments mean that – for the first time in history – satellite and other forms of 
surveillance make it all but impossible to hide the physical evidence of mass atrocity 
crimes.  Sites of suspicious activity can now be monitored on an ongoing basis, and 
sequential satellite images can be used to track events chronologically.  Satellite 
images taken at the time of the genocide in Srebrenica, for example, reveal mass 
grave sites in which the Serbian perpetrators buried more than 8000 Bosnian men 
and boys.156  The Geographic Information Systems project Conflict and Genocide in 
Former Yugoslavia, 1991-1995 created by Yale University’s Genocide Studies 
Program, has subsequently become an invaluable resource in which satellite images 
documenting the processes of destruction in Bosnia can be utilised as historical 
evidence of events there. 
 
Similarly, the stark images on Amnesty International’s Eyes on Darfur satellite 
imagery project reveal the destruction of villages in Darfur through juxtaposing 
‘before’ and ‘after’ images.  Eyes on Darfur is credited with most likely protecting 12 
villages in Darfur and eastern Chad from attack during the crisis there.157  In 
circumstances of imminent ethnic cleansing or genocide, judicious use and 
publication of satellite imagery – or images collected from unmanned aerial vehicles 
– can communicate to organisers of such crime that the world is watching.  While 
not singularly sufficient, this can contribute to protecting vulnerable minorities.   
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The Imposition of ‘No-fly’ Zones 
 
No fly zones are a measure that can be implemented to provide limited protection to 
civilians caught up in a conflict situation.  They can be of some effect, while not 
requiring the resources and risks associated with full-scale military intervention.  In 
Iraq between 1991-2003, for example, no-fly zones imposed over areas of the north 
and south of the country helped to protect small groups of targeted minorities 
there.158  There have been multiple calls for a no-fly zone to be imposed over Darfur, 
where the specific circumstances of the crisis render them likely to be quite 
effective:  
 
A dozen French and German fighter aircraft based in Cahd could protect the 
defenceless Darfurian villages from air attack.  Is this a likely scenario?  Of 
course it isn’t – at the moment the political will does not exist in the UN and 
EU to take such a decisive military action.  Imposing a no-fly zone, however, 
would save lives.159 
 
To be effective, no-fly zones must be adequately defended if necessary.  Yet they 
offer a relatively low-risk and potentially effective intervention strategy to respond 
to R2P crimes in a “timely and decisive manner” when action under pillar three is 
appropriate. 
 
Peacekeeping Missions 
 
Peacekeeping missions may be deployed to monitor and supervise cease-fire 
agreements and/or oversee the implementation of peace agreements.160  Traditional 
peacekeeping missions have been “premised on the consent of all the parties to the 
conflict, expected to remain completely impartial between them, and not mandated 
or expected to use force except in self-defense if under attack.”161  Issues that have 
arisen out of some of these missions, however, have recently led to more robust 
missions, often with a civilian protection role.  Dubbed ‘peacekeeping plus’ or 
‘complex peacekeeping’ missions, they have a greater range of options and 
resources to assist in achieving their mandate.162 
 
Consensual peacekeeping missions have had notable successes in preventing deadly 
conflict.  The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in 
Macedonia is widely considered an example of successful preventive deployment.  
The United Nations Operation in Cote D’Ivoire (UNOCI) may also have forestalled an 
escalation of conflict there, in circumstances where Cote D’Ivoire was regarded as a 
nation at very high risk of the outbreak of mass atrocities.  By contrast, the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda tragically failed to protect the Rwandan 
people from the 1994 genocide there.  There remains space to further develop 
consensual peacekeeping missions to ensure they are as effective as possible, and 
strongly focussed towards R2P where relevant. 
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Opening Borders 
 
In circumstances where the onset of mass atrocities appears imminent, the opening 
of borders can be a highly effective strategy.  As the political scientist Benjamin 
Valentino remarked, “History ... demonstrates that the ability of potential victims of 
mass killing to flee across borders often has been a critical factor in limiting or 
averting mass killing.”163  There is no doubt that opening borders would have saved 
innumerable Jewish lives during World War Two.  Such actions are themselves not 
without adverse consequences, as Valentino recognised.  For example, mortality 
rates amongst refugees are often very high, and rarely could this action be expected 
to foster some more permanent solution to the conflict.  Additionally, open borders 
and allowing refugee flows can present an uncomfortable challenge to traditional 
conceptions of sovereignty.  Nevertheless, in circumstances “when mass killing is 
imminent or in progress”, and where the international community is unable to 
facilitate a more assertive “timely and decisive” response, there is little question that 
opening borders would save lives.164  In extreme circumstances, such unconventional 
approaches to R2P should not be summarily discounted.  Preventing the next 
Rwanda, or the next Bosnia, or indeed the next Darfur, has to be preferable to 
apologising afterwards.   
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9.  Conclusion
 
 
Countless lives have been lost, and countless more shattered by the mass atrocity 
crimes of the past century.  The tragedy of these losses is compounded when we 
consider the missed opportunities that might have prevented, or curbed, many of 
these terrible events.  As this report has elucidated, genocide and mass atrocities are 
preventable.  Nations can incorporate structural prevention measures into their 
operation that reduce the capacity for extreme violence.  States recognised as being 
at some risk can implement a selection of strategies to reduce that risk and create 
barriers to escalation.  The international community can offer assistance in myriad 
ways to strengthen the protection of populations everywhere.  Even in 
circumstances where there appears to be strong likelihood of imminent violence, 
there are options available for concerted action to protect vulnerable populations.  
The Responsibility to Protect recognises that the challenge of preventing mass 
atrocities is ambitious, but achievable.  It recognises that the international inaction 
as the genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia were underway should not be repeated, and 
that there is an international responsibility to protect populations from extreme 
violence.  In many respects it represents an unprecedented opportunity for the 
international community to profoundly impact upon the incidence of mass violence 
in our world.   
 
Yet in seeking to address the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity, it must be recognised that there have been many 
failures, and few successes, in past attempts at doing so.  The Responsibility to 
Protect is not the first international instrument aimed toward the prevention of 
mass atrocity crimes.  Only sixty years ago, the world swore never again in the wake 
of the Holocaust.  Yet despite this commitment, the resulting Convention on the 
Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was insufficient to forestall 
the genocides that marred the latter half of the twentieth century.  The international 
community must commit to moving beyond rhetoric and towards the ongoing 
operationalisation of its principles.  The present report has expounded on some of 
the ways in which it may do so.  The challenge is now to enact them.   
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